Limitation of State Prisoners\u27 Civil Rights Suits in the Federal Courts by McCarty, Michael Noone
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 27 
Issue 1 Fall 1977 Article 6 
1977 
Limitation of State Prisoners' Civil Rights Suits in the Federal 
Courts 
Michael Noone McCarty 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Michael N. McCarty, Limitation of State Prisoners' Civil Rights Suits in the Federal Courts, 27 Cath. U. L. 
Rev. 115 (1978). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol27/iss1/6 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
NOTE
LIMITATION OF STATE PRISONERS' CIVIL
RIGHTS SUITS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
In Monroe v. Pape,I the Supreme Court held that a person deprived of
his constitutional rights by a state official acting in abuse of his position
could recover damages in a civil action. 2 In the sixteen years since
Monroe, the federal courts have been inundated with a steadily increas-
ing number of suits3 brought by prisoners against prison officials under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. 4 This surge in prisoner suits has put a severe strain on
1. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
2. See Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw.
U.L. REV. 277 (1965).
3. Actual statistics on prisoners' § 1983 cases have been kept only recently. State
prisoners' civil rights actions totaled 3,348 in fiscal 1972; 4,174 in fiscal 1973; 5,236 in
fiscal 1974; 6,128 in fiscal 1975; and 6,958 in fiscal 1976. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,'
RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS CASES IN THE FED-
ERAL COURTS 6 (Tentative Report No. 2, 1977) [hereinafter cited as ALDISERT REPORT],
(citing Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, 1976).
Examples of prisoners' rights which have been found actionable include the eighth
amendment freedom from cruel and unusual punishment in Sinclair v. Henderson, 435
F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1970); the right to essential medical attention in Redding v. Pate, 220 F.
Supp. 124 (N.D. Ill. 1963); free access to the courts in Stiltner v. Rhay, 322 F.2d 314 (9th
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 920 (1964); freedom from interference with religious
beliefs in Cruz v. Beto, 329 F. Supp. 443 (S.D. Tex. 1970), aff'd, 445 F.2d 801 (5th Cir.
1971); right to assistance of counsel in Latham v. Oswald, 359 F. Supp. 85 (S.D.N.Y.
1973); and freedom from racial discrimination in Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
See generally Comment, The Rights of Prisoners While Incarcerated, 15 BUFFALO L. REV.
397 (1965); see also Comment, Prisoners' Rights Litigation: An Examination into the
Appurtenant Procedural Problems, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 345 (1974).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
The overall effect of Monroe v. Pape is indicated by statistics which show that in fiscal
1960 there were only 280 cases of any nature brought under § 1983; in fiscal 1970 there
were 3,586, an increase of 1,100%. See Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of Federal Juris-
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the federal judicial system, especially the district courts. 5
The judicial quagmire is compounded by the fact that most prisoner
rights actions are brought in forma pauperis.6 As one court has noted:
[p]ersons proceeding in forma pauperis are immune from impo-
sition of costs if they are unsuccessful; and because of their
poverty, they are practically immune from later tort actions for
'malicious prosecution' or abuse of process. Thus indigents,
unlike other litigants, approach the courts in a context where
they have nothing to lose and everything to gain. The temptation
to file complaints that contain facts which cannot be proved is
obviously stronger in such a situation. For convicted prisoners
with much idle time and free paper, ink, law books, and mailing
privileges the temptation is especially strong. 7
"Writ writing" relieves boredom and is one of the few activities avail-
able to inmates that is beyond the administrative control of prison au-
thorities. 8 Because the threat of perjury prosecution has only a minimal
deterrent effect on imprisoned felons, 9 a large percentage of prisoner
suits are frivolous or malicious in nature.10
diction: A Federal Judge's Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity and the Federal Caseload,
1973 LAW & Soc. ORD. 557, 563 (1973).
5. It is significant to note that the dramatic increase in § 1983 suits has been accom-
panied by only a slight decline in habeas corpus actions. The number of federal habeas
corpus actions brought by state prisoners was 7,949 in 1972; 7,784 in 1973; 7,626 in 1974;
7,843 in 1975; and 7,833 in 1976. See ALDISERT REPORT, supra note 3, at 6 n.10 (citing
Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
1976).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1970) provides in part:
Any court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or
defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein,
without prepayment of fees and costs or security therefor, by a person who
makes affidavit that he is unable to pay such costs or give security therefor. Such
affidavit shall state the nature of the action, defense or appeal and affiant's belief
that he is entitled to redress.
A recent study of the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, showed that in the
two years surveyed, every § 1983 action filed by a prisoner was accompanied by a request
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis under § 1915. Bailey, The Realities of Prisoners'
Cases Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: A Statistical Survey in the Northern District of Illinois, 6
Loy. CHI. L.J. 527, 530 (1975).
7. Braden v. Estelle, 428 F. Supp. 595, 597-98 (S.D. Tex. 1977), quoting Jones v.
Bales, 58 F.R.D. 453,463 (N.D. Ga. 1972), aff'dpercuriam, 480 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1973).
8. Braden v. Estelle, 428 F. Supp. at 598. See Hooks v. Kelley, 463 F.2d 1210, 1211
(5th Cir. 1972), holding that prison regulations or actions which impinge upon a prisoner's
right to communicate with the courts are unconstitutional. See also Younger v. Gilmore,
404 U.S. 15 (1971), aff'g Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105, 110-12 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
9. One judge remarked that prisoners "do not hesitate to allege whatever they think is
required in order to get themselves even the temporary relief of a proceeding in court."
Weller v. Dickson, 314 F.2d 598, 602 (9th Cir. 1963).
10. See Bailey, supra note 6, at 531. Of the 218 prisoner claims under § 1983 in the
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As the number of prisoner petitions has ballooned, those courts most
affected by the onslaught have begun to attack the problem, primarily by
adopting procedures to streamline the processing of inmates' claims. In
addition, a special committee appointed by the Federal Judicial Center
has recently submitted a tentative report recommending procedures for
more efficient handling of prisoners' rights cases in federal courts." A
number of courts have already adopted several of the report's proposals.
A very few courts have required that prisoners exhaust state administra-
tive remedies before bringing suit in federal court.12 The United States
District Court for the Southern District of Texas has attempted to attack
the problem at its roots by assessing a "partial payment" with in forma
pauperis cases when payment of all fees would work a hardship, but
payment of a nominal sum would not.13 This approach is unique because
it forces the inmate to weigh his chances of success against the cost of
bringing the action, just as any other potential civil litigant must do,
without unfairly impeding the prosecution of meritorious claims.
The aim of this Note is to examine the emerging state of the law
regarding the handling of prisoners' section 1983 cases in federal courts
and to suggest methods to more effectively limit such actions without
impinging upon the prisoners' right to have their grievances heard. This
article approaches the subject from a procedural standpoint and does not
attempt to deal with recent court decisions which have more narrowly
limited the nature of actions cognizable under section 1983.1'
I. ORIGINS OF THE PROBLEM
In the past, the most viable form of federal post-conviction relief
available to state prisoners was a habeas corpus action brought under 28
U.S.C. § 2254.11 Following the Supreme Court's liberal reading of sec-
Northern District of Illinois in 1971, only seven actions were deemed meritorious enough
to deserve a hearing, and in only four of these cases did the prisoner prevail.
11. See ALDISERT REPORT, supra note 3. Judge Ruggero Aldisert of the Third Circuit
chaired the committee which conducted the study. He has become an authority on the
need for reform in handling inmates' § 1983 cases. See Aldisert, supra note 4. See also
notes 58-74 & accompanying text infra.
12. See notes 42-47 & accompanying text infra.
13. Braden v. Estelle, 428 F. Supp. 595, 598 (S.D. Tex. 1977); see notes 76-92 &
accompanying text infra.
14. See ALDISERT REPORT, supra note 3, at 31-39.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970). Originally habeas corpus was available only to challenge
the validity of an inmate's sentence or conviction. However, in Coffin v. Reichard, 143
F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944), the writ was expanded to cover challenges against uncon-
stitutional conditions of confinement. The Supreme Court affirmed this expansive role in
Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971). See generally Note, Federal Courts-
Bradford v. Weinstein: The Federal Courts Reopen the Door to Prisoners' Civil Rights
Claims, 54 N.C.L. REV. 1049 (1976).
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tion 1983 in Monroe v. Pape6 in 1961, however, prisoners rapidly began
to recognize the advantages a section 1983 action has over a habeas
corpus petition. Although the coverage of section 2254 and section 1983
overlaps, 17 the civil rights statute provides for a wider range of remedies,
including the granting of damages and the exercise of broad equity
powers.18 Prisoners can also maintain class action suits under section
1983.19 While discovery is unavailable in habeas corpus actions, except
by court order, discovery procedures are quite liberal under section
1983.20
The greatest advantage of section 1983, however, is that state reme-
dies need not be exhausted before the action is commenced in federal
court. 2' However, the no-exhaustion rule is limited to cases properly
16. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See text accompanying notes I & 2 supra; see also note 21
infra.
17. See note 5 supra.
18. The statute itself provides the injured party with "an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). See Note, supra note
15, at 1053-54.
Examples of situations in which the courts have awarded damages under § 1983 include
Carter v. Noble, 526 F.2d 677, 678-79 (5th Cir. 1976) ($1,000 plus attorney's fees awarded
against a jailer who ordered an employee to cut the inmate's hair when the inmate was
about to be released from jail), and Vargas v. Correa, 416 F. Supp. 266, 272 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) ($250 in actual damages and $300 in punitive damages were awarded against a prison
guard for an unjustified beating of the plaintiff).
Courts have also exercised broad equity powers under § 1983. See, e.g., Taylor v.
Perini, 413 F. Supp. 189, 194 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (prison officials enjoined from censoring
mail, interfering with prisoners' access to the courts, and engaging in racial discrimina-
tion); Tate v. Kassulke, 409 F. Supp. 651, 662-63 (W.D. Ky. 1976) (prison officials
ordered, inter alia, to spray inmates' cells to eradicate vermin and rodents).
Courts may also make declaratory judgments under § 1983, whether or not such
pronouncements are accompanied by injunctive relief. See, e.g., Collins v. Schoonfield,
344 F. Supp. 257 (D. Md. 1972) (declaratory judgments rendered concerning mail censor-
ship, food quality, solitary confinement, medical conditions, visitation rights, telephone
access, etc.).
19. See Note, supra note 15, at 1054 n.41. Taylor v. Perini, 413 F. Supp. 189 (N.D.
Ohio 1976), is a good example of a successful prisoner class action. See note 18 supra.
20. The general discovery procedures provided in Rules 26 and 33 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure are available to Civil Rights Act litigants. These procedures are
inappropriate and unavailable in habeas corpus proceedings in which the district court
must first authorize discovery procedures that are suitable. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S.
286, 290 (1969).
21. In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), the Supreme Court stated that "[i]t is no
answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is
supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused
before the federal one is invoked." Id. at 183. The Court has confirmed on a number of
occasions what it strongly suggested in Monroe-that 'if a remedy under the Civil Rights
Act is available, a plaintiff need not first seek redress in a state forum." Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 477 (1973). See also Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426,432-33 (1975);
Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968);
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brought under section 1983. When the prisoner is challenging the validity
or duration of confinement, habeas corpus is the appropriate mecha-
nism, 22 and the complainant must first resort to any state proceedings
which are both adequate and available.23
II. "TRADITIONAL" METHODS OF LIMITING PRISONERS'
SECTION 1983 SUITS IN FEDERAL COURTS
The in forma pauperis statute 24 itself provides the courts with some
measure of relief from the growing number of prisoner suits. Under
section 1915(d), 25 a trial court may dismiss a complaint in an in forma
pauperis proceeding if the court is satisfied that the suit is "frivolous" or
"malicious." 26 Just as it is within the sound discretion of the trial judge
to determine whether or not a petitioner will be accorded pauper status
King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 312 n.4 (1968); Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967);
McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 671 (1963).
For a discussion of the exhaustion requirement in civil rights cases, see Comment,
Exhaustion of State Remedies in Section 1983 Cases, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 537 (1974). See
also Comment, Exhaustion of State Administrative Remedies Under the Civil Rights Act,
8 IND. L. REV. 565 (1975); Comment, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Prisoner Petitions-Exhaustion of
State Administrative Remedies, 28 ARK. L. REV. 479 (1975).
22. The Supreme Court has held that when an applicant seeks release from, or chal-
lenges the duration of his custody, his sole remedy lies in habeas corpus and is subject to
the § 2254 exhaustion requirement. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489-91, 500 (1973).
But cf. Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971) (claims of mistreatment and restric-
tive conditions, although actionable for habeas corpus, also state a cause of action under§ 1983 and therefore are not subject to the exhaustion requirement). Although Wilwording
can be distinguished since it involved challenges to the conditions rather than the validity
or duration of incarceration, Preiser indicated a genuine shift in the Court's perspective
and can be read to undercut the liberal trend of Wilwording. Comment, Exhaustion of
State Administrative Remedies in Section 1983 Cases, 41 U. CHi. L. REV. 537, 546-47
(1974).
23. The habeas corpus statute, requires an exhaustion of state remedies:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears
that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State,
or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the
existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the
rights of the prisoner.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1970).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1970). See note 6 supra.
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) provides in part that "[t]he court ... may dismiss the case if
the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious."
26. See, e.g., Van Meter v. Morgan, 518 F.2d 366, 368 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
896 (1975) (complaint stating causes of action duplicative of previous unsuccessful actions
by same prisoner was properly dismissed as "frivolous"); Daye v. Bounds, 509 F.2d 66
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1002 (1975) (flood of legal correspondence between
plaintiff and courts supported district judge's determination that plaintiff's claim of denial
of use of the mails was "patently frivolous").
The terms "frivolous" and "malicious" are not defined in the statute, and the Supreme
1977]
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under section 1915,27 it is also within his discretion to dismiss a claim
which he deems to be frivolous or malicious.28 Courts have exercised
especially broad discretion to dismiss suits brought by prisoners against
wardens and other state prison officials.29 A significant number of judges
have also viewed section 1915(d) as a grant of discretion to dismiss a
claim as "frivolous" in situations in which summary judgment under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure30 was foreclosed. 3 1 These courts will
Court has never offered an interpretation of either term in the context of a § 1915(d)
dismissal. A number of lower court decisions, however, give some insight into an appro-
priate standard for such a dismissal. In Serna v. O'Donnell, the court said that "a
determination as to frivolity is a legal determination as to whether there 'exists substan-
tiality to such a claim, of justiciable basis and impressing reality.' " 70 F.R.D. 618, 621
(W.D. Mo. 1976) (quoting Carey v. Settle, 351 F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1965)). In a similar vein,
the court in Jones v. Bales stated that "[iln light of 1915(d)'s general purpose, the specific
term 'frivolous' refers to an action in which the plaintiff's realistic chances of ultimate
success are slight." 58 F.R.D. 453, 464 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
27. Permission to proceed in forma pauperis is a privilege rather than a right. Brewster
v. North Am. Van Lines, Inc., 461 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1972); Higgins v. Steele, 195 F.2d 366
(8th Cir. 1952). Nevertheless, in recent years courts appear to have used $50 in
available assets as an approximate dividing line between indigency and ability to pay
costs, at least in the case of prisoner suits. See, e.g., Ward v. Werner, 61 F.R.D. 639
(M.D. Pa. 1974) (two plaintiffs with $50 and $65, respectively, held not paupers);
Shimabuku v. Britton, 357 F. Supp. 825 (D. Kan. 1973) (plaintiffs with $45, $51.27 and
$61.41, respectively, held not indigent). The Supreme Court has stated that indigency is a
relative concept not necessarily synonymous with absolute destitution. Adkins v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331 (1948).
28. See, e.g., Carter v. Thomas, 527 F.2d 1332, 1333 (5th Cir. 1976).
29. See, e.g., Torres v. Garcia, 444 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1971); Shobe v. California, 362
F.2d 545 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 887 (1966) (district courts' denial of motions to
proceed in forma pauperis in civil rights actions brought by prisoners not abuse of
discretion). But see Simmons v. Maslysnky, 45 F.R.D. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (district court
must grant petitioner's motion to proceed in forma pauperis in § 1983 action to compel trial
court stenographer to provide copy of trial transcript).
See Bailey, supra note 6, at 531, in which the author characterizes the general judicial
disposition of prisoner rights claims in Northern Illinois (all filed in forma pauperis) as
"wholesale dismissals," since only 3.2% of the actions ever reached the hearing stage.
30. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) provides that a motion may be made by the defense
alleging the plaintiff's "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." The
motion is treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of pursuant to Rule 56(b)
which provides that "[a] party against whom a claim, counter-claim, or cross-claim is
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may, at any time, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof."
Summary judgment is an "extreme remedy" which will not be entered except when the
movant is entitled to its allowance beyond all doubt. City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422
F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970).
31. Jones v. Bales, 58 F.R.D. 453 (N.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 480 F.2d 805 (5th
Cir. 1973). The court stated that § 1915(d) "is a grant of power to dismiss in situations
where dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 might be improper." 58 F.R.D.
at 463 (citations omitted). "The Federal Rules . . . are inadequate to protect the courts
and defendants-who it should be remembered pay for their defense-from frivolous
litigation from indigent prisoners." Id. The Court noted that "The liberal approach of the
[Vol. 27:115
Limitation of Prisoner Civil Rights
dismiss an in forma pauperis action if the complaint states a claim "in
which the plaintiff's realistic chances of ultimate success are slight." 32
Most courts, however, hold it improper to deny a prisoner leave to
commence his action in forma pauperis in the initial stages of the suit on
the ground that the complaint is frivolous.3 3 Instead, if the affidavit of
indigency on its face satisfies the particular court's discretionary finan-
cial requirements under section 1915(d), the court grants leave to pro-
ceed in forma pauperis. Only after the case has been docketed does the
court check whether the allegations of poverty are true and scrutinize the
complaint to determine whether it is "frivolous" or "malicious. " 34 This
procedure insures that a sincere but impecunious prisoner's claim will
not be cursorily discarded before its potential merits can be developed,35
Rules is probably desirable, but the rules contemplate litigants who are limited by the
realities of time and expense. They also contemplate litigants with a basic respect for
accuracy."
It is plain to this Court that courts need an extra measure of authority when
faced with actions proceeding in forma pauperis-particularly where the action is
brought by a prisoner seeking damages. And it is this Court's conclusion that
Congress has granted that extra authority by enacting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).
Id. at 464. See also Daves v. Scranton, 66 F.R.D. 5, 7 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
32. Jones v. Bales, 58 F.R.D. at 464. This appears to be the case in most instances
despite the Supreme Court's apparently conflicting ruling in Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519 (1972), that pro se complaints are to be read under less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by attorneys, and should be dismissed only if it appears "beyond doubt
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him
to relief." 404 U.S. at 521 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
Serna v. O'Donnell, 70 F.R.D. 618 (W.D. Mo. 1976) attempts to reconcile the facially
contradictory themes of Haines and § 1915(d):
A decision as to frivolity or maliciousness is an extremely important one, because
dismissal of frivolous actions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) is appropriate to
prevent abuses of the processes of the Court. Harkins v. Eldredge, 505 F.2d 802
(8th Cir. 1974). This responsibility to dismiss cases that are frivolous or malicious
must be balanced against the predisposition in favor of liberal construction of pro
se prisoner pleadings ...
...After understanding what the prisoner is alleging, the Court must, if there
is a request to proceed in forma pauperis, determine whether the case is frivolous
or malicious. Whereas in understanding a pleading, leniency is necessary to
counteract the plaintiff's lack of legal expertise, the same degree of predisposi-
tion in favor of the pro se plaintiff is not called for when a determination is made
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).
Id. at 621.
33. Sinwell v. Schapp, 536 F.2d 15, 19 (3d Cir. 1976). See also cases cited in note 34
infra.
34. See Taylor v. Gibson, 529 F.2d 709, 714 n.6 (5th Cir. 1976); Forester v. California
Adult Auth., 510 F.2d 58, 60 (8th Cir. 1975); Stiltner v. Rhay, 332 F.2d 314, 317 (9th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 920 (1964); Ragan v. Cox, 305 F.2d 58, 60 (10th Cir. 1962).
But see Shobe v. California, 322 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1966) (discretion to deny state
prisoners privilege of commencing and prosecuting suit in forma pauperis is "especially
broad" in civil actions against prison officials).
35. Urbano v. Sondern, 41 F.R.D. 355, 357 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 370 F.2d 13, 14 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1034 (1967).
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and allows an orderly and complete record to be made in each case for
the benefit of both the district court and the appeals court .36 In addition,
the respondent is spared the burden of making a reply pleading in a
patently frivolous action.37 However, this procedure does not solve the
basic problem of cluttered dockets, since judges and magistrates are still
forced to spend valuable time and energy scrutinizing the large percent-
age of frivolous suits.
Another process used by the courts to limit the barrage of baseless
civil suits has been the injunction. 38 Injunctions usually are issued
against petitioners who have been excessively litigious concerning a
certain subject matter or who appear intent on harassing the defend-
ant(s). 39 The appropriate use of these writs is very limited, however, as
they may only be used to enjoin further frivolous litigation of a fairly
specific claim against an already beleaguered defendant. 40 A "blanket"
injunction, foreclosing the inmate from filing further civil actions of any
nature against a particular defendant, would be an unconstitutional de-
nial of the inmate's right of access to the courts. 41 Furthermore, the
injunction does not remedy the primary problem of an overcrowded
docket, since it is usually not issued until after the court has been
subjected to a series of complaints.
III. RECENT TRENDS IN LIMITING SECTION 1983 PRISONER SUITS
A. Exhaustion of State Administrative Remedies
The great majority of lower federal courts have followed the Supreme
Court's admonition in Monroe v. Pape42 that in civil rights cases "[t]he
federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need
not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked." 43
However, several courts have factually limited the Monroe line of deci-
36. Cole v. Smith, 344 F.2d 721, 723 (8th Cir. 1965).
37. Forester v. California Adult Auth., 510 F.2d 58, 60 (8th Cir. 1975).
38. Courts base their authority to issue injunctions in such cases on 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)
(1970), which provides that "[t]he Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of
Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective juris-
dictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law."
39. See, e.g., Ex pare Tyler, 70 F.R.D. 456 (E.D. Mo. 1975) (injunction issued against
prisoner after filing eighteenth in a series of frivolous suits over same subject matter);
Rudnicki v. McCormack, 210 F. Supp. 905 (D.R.I. 1962), appeal dismissed, 372 U.S. 226
(1963) (litigious inmate barred from instituting further suits charging conspiracy of state
and federal judges to deny inmate of civil rights).
40. See Adams v. American Bar Ass'n, 400 F. Supp. 219, 227 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
41. See Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971), aff'g Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp.
105 (N.D. Cal. 1970); note 8 supra.
42. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See note 21 & accompanying text supra.
43. 365 U.S. at 183.
[Vol. 27:115
Limitation of Prisoner Civil Rights
sions. Because res judicata and collateral estoppel may bar a federal
action after a state judicial determination, but not after a state adminis-
trative proceeding, 44 the Second and Seventh Circuits have required
exhaustion if the plaintiff has available an adequate administrative reme-
dy at the state level. 45 These courts distinguished Monroe and subse-
quent Supreme Court decisions either because the only remedy available
to the plaintiff at the state level was judicial, because only an inadequate
or futile administrative proceeding existed, or because the action chal-
lenged the facial constitutionality of a state statute.46 The Supreme Court
recently refused to decide whether an exhaustion requirement is appro-
priate when there is clearly an adequate state administrative remedy
available .47
The exhaustion requirement has been criticized on the ground that
federally protected fundamental rights should not be sacrificed by forc-
ing prisoners to exhaust state administrative remedies. 8 At the heart of
this argument is the fear that a state administrative system may systemat-
44. See, e.g., Spence v. Latting, 512 F.2d 93 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 896
(1975) (state judicial action in § 1983 cases is res judicata). Judge Aldisert suggests that if
the res judicata - collateral estoppel problem is the main reason for the courts' refusal to
impose an exhaustion requirement in § 1983 suits as they do in § 2254 habeas corpus
actions, then "a change in the applicability of res judicata can be made by statute if
necessary." ALDISERT REPORT, supra note 3, at 15 n.24. See generally Note, Constitution-
al Law-Civil Rights-Section 1983-Res Judicata/Collateral Estoppel, 1974 Wis. L.
REV. 1180 (1974).
45. Metcalf v. Swank, 444 F.2d 1353 (7th Cir. 1971); James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d
566, 570-71 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972); Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560
(2d Cir. 1969). But see McCray v. Burrell, 516 F.2d 357 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 423 U.S.
923 (1975), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 426 U.S. 471 (1976).
46. In Metcalf, the Seventh Circuit distinguished the Supreme Court's decisions in
Monroe (only remedy available was judicial); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968)
(exhaustion would have been futile since appropriate state administrator had already
taken a position adverse to the petitioner's claim); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968)
(administrative remedies inappropriate in both cases because state statutes were challeng-
ed as facially unconstitutional); Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416(1967) and McNeese v.
Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963) (only power of appropriate administrator was to
recommend institution of state court proceedings).
The Fourth Circuit in McCray v. Burrell, however, recently took a much more confin-
ing view of the Supreme Court's exhaustion pronouncements. In overturning a district
court order which had dismissed a prisoner's § 1983 suit for initial failure to resort to an
inmate grievance procedure provided by the state, the appeals courts said, "we are
constrained to conclude that the holding that exhaustion is required may be reached only
by either legislation conditioning resort to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 upon exhaustion of available
administrative remedies, or by the Supreme Court's re-examination and modification of
its controlling adjudications on the subject." 516 F.2d 357, 360 (4th Cir.), cert. granted,
423 U.S. 923 (1975), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 426 U.S. 471 (1976).
47. Burrell v. McCray, 426 U.S. 471 (1976), dismissing cert. as improvidently granted
to McCray v. Burrell, 516 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1975).
48. See, e.g., McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 674 (1963), in which Justice
Douglas said, "It is immaterial whether respondents' conduct is legal or illegal as a matter
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ically use its own procedures to discriminate against prisoners because of
their status. While such fears may be valid in some instances, any
inequities in the administrative system can just as easily be attacked on
subsequent appeals to the federal courts. When the plaintiff is able to
show that the state is using the administrative grievance process to
harass or deter him from seeking his federally protected rights, 49 or when
the plaintiff's case involves a substantial challenge to the constitutionali-
ty of a state statute or regulation, 50 the courts could forego the exhaus-
tion requirement as futile. Otherwise, when a state provides inmates with
an apparently fair and adequate grievance procedure and with methods
for developing and preserving a factual record of the procedures in-
volved, prisoners should be required to exhaust their administrative
remedies. 51 "The fact is that state prisons are state institutions and
needed reforms must ultimately come from the state."5 2 Since there are
no bars of res judicata or collateral estoppel when state administrative
remedies are exhausted, "[e]xhaustion of adequate administrative reme-
dies in st.ction 1983 cases allows the state agency to apply its expertise,
develop a factual record, and cure its own errors without prejudicing the
litigant's right to a federal forum." 53
Several states have established administrative grievance procedures
for prisoners, 54 with the result that a significant percentage of the griev-
ances are resolved either at the institutional level or at the administrative
appeals level. 55 In Maryland, the grievance mechanism has reduced
prisoner filings in the federal district court by sixty-six percent. 56 Al-
though this trend is encouraging, the full value of such programs cannot
be realized until it is clear that exhaustion of state administrative reme-
dies is appropriate in section 1983 cases. Since such a declaration cannot
of state law. Such claims are entitled to be adjudicated in the federal courts" (citations
omitted).
49. See Comment, supra note 22, at 550.
50. See Comment, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Prisoner Petitions-Exhaustion of State Adminis-
trative Remedies, 28 ARK. L. REV. 479, 488 (1975).
51. Polices other than comity which favor exhaustion include: "(1) The facilitation of
subsequent judicial review after the agency has exercised its administrative expertise; (2)
the development of a factual record; (3) agency opportunity to correct its own errors; and
(4) possible saving of judicial time if administrative relief is granted." Cravatt v. Thomas,
399 F. Supp. 956, 969-70 (W.D. Wis. 1975).
52. Aldisert, supra note 4, at 565.
53. Comment, supra note 22, at 552.
54. E.g., 4A MD. ANN. CODE § 41-204F (Supp. 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 148-101 to
148-113 (Supp. 1975). For a bibliography of literature on different grievance mechanisms
in operation today, see ALDISERT REPORT, supra note 3, at 17 n.28.
55. ALDISERT REPORT, supra note 3, at 19.
56. See Comment, supra note 50, at 488 (citing 6 THE THIRD BRANCH 4, 7 (Apr. 19,
1974)).
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be expected from the Supreme Court in the near future, 57 Congress might
do well to consider amending section 1983 to require administrative
exhaustion in appropriate instances.
B. Streamlined Handling of Prisoner Complaints
under Section 1983
In addition to encouraging the expanded use of administrative griev-
ance procedures, 58 the Federal Judicial Center's Aldisert Report5 9 pro-
poses several measures designed to streamline the handling of prisoners'
civil rights cases. The report suggests that compensated counsel be made
available to inmates with grievances.60 While such a program would not
actually "streamline" the handling of an individual case, the presence of
attorneys should discourage the filing of frivolous cases. 61 A lawyer-
drawn complaint is also usually easier for a judge or magistrate to
decipher than a pro se complaint. The committee expressed the view that
reliance on uncompensated counsel or legal assistants is "not totally
satisfactory" because an inmate is more likely to be successful in pre-
senting important constitutional issues for "meaningful and prompt dis-
position," with paid representation 62 and because only compensated
counsel "will be able to discourage frivolous cases and will more careful-
ly limit and define the issues presented. ", 63
Judge Aldisert's committee report does not, however, address the cost
factor involved in retaining paid attorneys. Those costs make such a
program unattractive to most courts in the absence of specific public
funding. A far more economically feasible alternative would be to allow
Legal Services lawyers or law students in legal aid programs to counsel
inmates with grievances. 64 Such representatives should be competent to
determine whether or not the inmate has a valid cause of action. Their
ability to discourage the filing of baseless actions could be strengthened
57. See note 47 & accompanying text supra.
58. See ALDISERT REPORT, supra note 3, at 17-21.
59. See note 3 & text accompanying note 1 supra.
60. See ALDISERT REPORT, supra note 3, at 10.
61. !d. The committee cites Ault, Legal Aid for Inmates as an Approach to Grievance
Resolution, I RESOLUTION OF CORRECTIONAL PROBLEMS AND ISSUES 28, 32 (1975), which
gives the results of an empirical study showing that availability of counsel does apparently
serve to lessen the number of clearly frivolous lawsuits.
62. ALDISERT REPORT at 10 n.18 (citing the REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL
COURTS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK (1974) at 2).
63. ALDISERT REPORT at 10.
64. See Comment, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983: An Emerging Vehicle of Post-Conviction
Relief for State Prisoners, 22 U. FLA. L. REV. 596, 608 (1970).
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania has been utilizing law students from Temple
University and the University of Pennsylvania to represent indigent prisoners in § 1983
cases. In the Western District of Wisconsin, the Corrections Legal Service Program, a
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by permitting the courts to subject inmates who bring frivolous or mali-
cious suits against the advice of legal assistants to contempt charges. 65
The committee also proposed several procedural standards to acceler-
ate and improve the processing of inmate complaints in the district
courts. Essentially, these procedures would provide a separate, central-
ized mechanism for handling prisoners' rights cases. 66 A special "intake
clerk" would initially determine whether the complaint and affidavit of
indigency are in proper order. Then a staff law clerk or magistrate would
perform the first screening of the complaint and make recommendations
to the judge as to whether the claim is frivolous or meritorious. 67
The report also contains suggested forms for use by the inmate in filing
the complaint and pauper affidavit. 8 The complaint form is designed to
elicit from the prisoner all the relevant facts of his grievance, and at the
same time eliminate the incidence of obscenities and bald conclusions of
law with which prisoner complaints are often replete. The form also
includes questions on whether the inmate has filed previous lawsuits
dealing with the same subject matter and whether the prisoner has
previously presented his problem through a state or institutional griev-
ance procedure. 69 The recommended in forma pauperis affidavit 7° is
project funded by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration as well as state
monies, handles about 10% of the prisoner actions filed in that court. State prisoner cases
are handled on a no-fee basis by special arrangement with the local bar associations in one
division of the Western District of Missouri. See ALDISERT REPORT, supra note 3, at 29
n.27. Additionally, the Inmate Legal Services Project of the Texas State Bar provides
attorneys at no cost to inmates. See Braden v. Estelle, 428 F. Supp. at 598.
65. See Comment, supra note 64, at 608. The power of the court to levy a contempt
charge in such a case should allay the Aldisert committee's fear that uncompensated
representation would be ineffective in discouraging frivolous suits.
66. See ALDISERT REPORT, supra note 3, at 45-49.
67. Id. Such a procedure is designed to relieve the judge of the task of poring over the
typically unsophisticated, often unintelligible pleadings, motions, briefs, and correspond-
ence of the pro se litigant. Similar programs are in use in several districts, including the
Central District of California (initial screening function performed by magistrate); the
Northern District of California ("writ clerk," a staff lawyer, receives all complaints from
the intake clerk after they are deemed to be in order); and the Southern District of New
York (staff clerk handles all pro se matters). See id. at 48 n.76.
68. See ALDISERT REPORT, supra note 3, at 83-87. These forms are also reproduced in
Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886, 893-98 (5th Cir. 1976).
69. See ALDISERT REPORT, supra note 3, at 83-84. The questions regarding the state or
institutional grievance procedure should be eliminated in districts in which there is no
adequate, readily available grievance procedure. Although exhaustion of these procedures
is not required by the courts, the committee felt that it was appropriate to include these
questions in the complaint form to alert the inmate of this nonjudicial method of obtaining
relief. Id. at 52-53. See also Hill v. Estelle, 423 F. Supp. 690, 694-95 (S.D. Tex. 1976), in
which the judge noted that " '[t]he questionnaire will also aid in ferreting out those
instances where prisoners abuse the processes of the courts by multiple filings.'
(Citation omitted).
70. See ALDISERT REPORT, supra note 3, at 86-87.
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designed to prevent fraudulent misrepresentations of financial status by
requiring far more specific and particularized statements than are re-
quired by the pauper affidavit form traditionally utilized in civil suits.71
The committee also recommended the use of a "special report 72 in
appropriate cases. Under this procedure, the defendant prison official is
ordered to investigate and report on specific allegations of the complaint.
The objective of the special report is "to discover the defendant's
version of the facts and . . . to encourage out-of-court settlement."
73
While it is still too early to evaluate fairly the effectiveness of the
procedures proposed in the Aldisert Report, many of the recommenda-
tions have been received warmly by the courts, particularly in the Fifth
Circuit. 74
C. The Braden Partial Payment Plan
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas has
been burdened with an inordinate number of prisoner civil rights suits,
primarily because twelve of the fifteen units of the Texas Department of
Corrections are located within its jurisdiction. 75 Approximately twenty
percent of all civil actions, and almost all in forma pauperis actions filed
in that district, are prisoner suits.
76
The district court had already implemented, with slight modifications,
most of the recommendations of the Aldisert Report, 7 when it received a
"specific mandate" from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals "to develop
imaginative and innovative methods of dealing with the flood of prisoner
complaints and suits." 78 Recognizing that the procedures in the Aldisert
Report, although helpful, are effective primarily in streamlining substan-
71. The affidavit proposed by the Aldisert committee requires the inmate to state his
employment situation, salary, income from such sources as rent payments, interest,
dividends, pensions, annuities, life insurance payments, gifts, and inheritances; also to
state the amount of cash on hand and in prison checking, and savings accounts. ALDISERT
REPORT, supra note 3, at 87. Compare with the traditional affidavit form found at 7
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PLEADINGS AND PRACTICE FORMS (Rev. Ed.) Costs, Form 57.
72. ALDISERT REPORT, supra note 3, at 73-76, 94-95. Credit for the concept is given to
District Judge Vincent Biunno of New Jersey. Hardwick v. Ault, 517 F.2d 295, 298 (5th
Cir. 1975).
73. ALDISERT REPORT, supra note 3, at 73. See Hardwick v. Ault, 517 F.2d at 298, in
which the court discussed the advantages of the special report.
74. See, e.g., Hardwick v. Ault, 517 F.2d at 298; Taylor v. Gibson, 529 F.2d 709, 717
(5th Cir. 1976); Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886, 891-92, 893-98 (5th Cir. 1976); Braden v.
Estelle, 428 F. Supp. 595, 597-98 (S.D. Tex. 1977); Hill v. Estelle, 423 F. Supp. 690,694-95
(S.D. Tex. 1976).
75. See Hill v. Estelle, 423 F. Supp. at 694.
76. Braden v. Estelle, 428 F. Supp. at 597.
77. Hill v. Estelle, 423 F. Supp. at 694.
78. Taylor v. Gibson, 529 F.2d 709, 717 (5th Cir. 1976).
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tive review measures once a case has been filed, the district court
responded by instituting a plan aimed directly at "the two major prob-
lems facing the court in this area, that is, (1) the large number of prisoner
cases and (2) the frivolous nature of many of them' 79 (court's emphasis).
The plan, outlined by Judge Bue, is as follows:*
(a) Institution of a partial payment requirement to be em-
ployed in those cases in which payment of all the fees
would work a hardship, but when the payment of a nominal
sum would not; and
(b) Determination of permission to proceed in forma pauperis
on a step-by-step basis as costs are incurred, rather than
the present method whereby the grant or denial of pauper
status applies to the entire proceedings.80
This policy is intended to reduce the vast number of frivolous suits by
forcing the inmate to "confront the initial dilemma which faces most
other potential civil litigants: is the merit of the claim worth the cost of
pursuing it?" 81 This should serve to discourage the type of "writ writ-
ing" which arises mainly from prisoners' boredom.82
At the same time, the program raises certain problems. The first area
of concern is the arbitrariness of the procedure. As Judge Bue himself
admits, "too many variables prohibit an enunciation of even rough
criteria at this time."183 Instead, each judge has discretion to determine
whether a partial payment is warranted and, if so, the amount of such
payment based on the prisoner's "financial history and present econom-
ic status." 84 Such flexibility necessarily invites unequal treatment and
may permit a judge's prejudice toward a litigant to influence his decision,
particularly if the prisoner has appeared before the judge previously.
Although granting leave to proceed in forma pauperis is by statute
discretionary,85 that discretion is limited and must not be abused. 86 Any
court which adopts the partial payment plan should attempt to develop
more concrete guidelines for its application. 87
79. Braden v. Estelle, 428 F. Supp. at 597.
80. Id. at 598.
81. Id. at 596 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 320 F. Supp. 581, 582 (S.D. Tex.
1970)).
82. See notes 7-10 & accompanying text supra.
83. Braden v. Estelle, 428 F. Supp. at 600. The judge points to the fact that the prison
accounts of many inmate litigants fluctuate greatly over time, thus preventing the court
from relying on an inmate's account balance at any particular date. Id.
84. Id. at 601.
85. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1970). See, e.g., United States v. Holiday, 436 F.2d 1079 (3d
Cir. 1971).
86. See, e.g., Van Meter v. Morgan, 518 F.2d 366 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 896
(1975).
87. This is, admittedly, more easily said than done. The ideal program would be to
[Vol. 27:1"15
Limitation of Prisoner Civil Rights
There is also some question about the efficiency of such a system,
particularly its provision for progressive determinations of cost liability
as costs arise during litigation. Although the concept of reevaluating a
litigant's status as a pauper as his case progresses is not new,88 the
administrative time and expense required to reassess a plaintiff's finan-
cial position each time a new cost arises, and then to decide the portion
of that cost for which the plaintiff will be liable, could negate any
administrative benefits of the partial payment requirement.
Because the partial payment procedure is a judicial concept grafted
onto the statutory procedures of the Civil Rights Act, there is also some
question whether a partial payment requirement would take the case out
of the parameters of the pauper statute. 9 Section 1915 contemplates a
complete waiver of costs and fees and has been viewed to vest an
especially high degree of discretion in the judge to dismiss the action if
he finds it "frivolous" or "malicious."I Judge Bue supported the partial
payment plan by citing an analogous provision in the criminal code 91
which allows a court to retain or terminate appointed counsel at any
point in the proceedings if the court finds that the defendant's financial
circumstances have changed. However, in criminal proceedings the par-
ty seeking pauper treatment is a defendant, and there is no mechanism
comparable to section 1915(d) for dismissing suits for frivolous defenses.
The situation is quite different when a civil plaintiff is petitioning to sue
in forma pauperis. It remains to be seen whether the liberal dismissal
standard used pursuant to section 1915(d) can be properly utilized in a
establish a schedule under which each prisoner litigant would be required to pay a certain
specified percentage of the costs involved, depending upon the total value of the prison-
er's reasonably liquid assets at the time the cost arises. As a rough example, all prisoners
with less than $40 in available assets might be allowed to proceed free of costs; prisoners
with $40 to $70 would be assessed one-third of the costs; prisoners with $70 to $100 would
pay two-thirds of the costs; and inmates with over $100 would pay the full amount of the
costs.
The main difficulty with such a program is in ascertaining the total value of the inmates'
available assets. Not only do inmates' prison account balances fluctuate greatly over short
spans of time (see note 83 supra), but it is difficult for prison officials to gauge the extent
of the inmates' holdings outside the institution. Furthermore, a prisoner's financial history
may be more relevant to a pauper determination than his current assets at a given time.
The pauper affidavit forms recommended in the ALDISERT REPORT are designed to enable
the courts to gain a fairly detailed accounting of the petitioner's liquid funds. See note 71
supra. The potential value of these forms can only be realized, however, if the courts take
punitive action against inmates who misrepresent their financial status, rather than merely
dismissing their petitions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
88. See Flowers v. Turbine Support Div., 507 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1975); McClure v.
Salvation Army, 51 F.R.D. 215 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
89. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1970). See notes 6 & 25 supra.
90. See notes 30-32 & accompanying text supra.
91. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(c) (1970).
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case in which the plaintiff has in fact paid a substantial portion of the
costs. It is at least arguable that under the partial payment requirement,
an action should not be dismissed unless it fails to state a claim on which
relief can be granted, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6).92
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Over the past decade and a half, the federal courts have experienced a
dramatic increase in the number of civil rights suits filed by state prison-
ers against prison officials. The courts have come to realize the mag-
nitude of the problem, but are torn between the need to limit section 1983
litigants' access to the federal forum and the need to preserve the
constitutional rights of inmates. The Supreme Court has refused to
require that a state prisoner exhaust his remedies at the state level before
proceeding in federal court, and the lower federal courts have largely
adhered to the high Court's policy in this regard.
The procedures recommended by the Aldisert Report, many of which
have been adopted in the Fifth Circuit and in sundry district courts
elsewhere, would make the processing of prisoner cases more efficient.
While these recommendations mark a major step in the right direction
and do not appear to endanger the opportunity for sincere litigants to
have their grievances heard, they are largely ineffective in attacking the
problem at its roots-that is, in curbing the tremendous volume of
lawsuits and the frivolous nature of most of them.
The partial payment procedure devised by Judge Bue in the Southern
District of Texas for use in pauper suits can become a valuable tool for
fighting the flood of prisoner litigation at its sources, but only if a more
concrete formula is developed which will assure all similarly situated
inmates of substantially equal treatment. There is also a question of
whether, having tendered a partial fee, the prisoner-plaintiff is technical-
ly a "pauper" within the meaning of section 1915. If not, the courts may
be prevented from exercising such broad discretion to dismiss a suit as
"frivolous" or "malicious" as can be done in cases properly under
section 1915(d) when the entire fee is waived.
92. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas has not
confronted the problem of whether a partial payment assessment would preclude the court
from dismissing a petition under § 1915(d), "because the frivolous/malicious determina-
tion is made prior to the consideration of whether a partial payment should be required."
Letter from Craig M. Sturtevant, staff attorney, United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas (Houston Division) (Aug. 15, 1977). However, this procedure
is in apparent contravention of the Fifth Circuit's instruction that in forma pauperis cases
be docketed prior to any consideration of the merits. See Taylor v. Gibson, 529 F.2d 709,
714 n.6 (5th Cir. 1976).
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Until the Supreme Court agrees to decide the question of whether
exhaustion of state administrative remedies can be required in section
1983 cases, the solutions will lie in the hands of the lower courts most
burdened with the problem. If their solutions fail to ease the overcrowd-
ing on the federal dockets, Congress may be forced to provide a more
permanent solution by amending section 1983.
Michael Noone McCarty
